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FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE: DETERMINATION OF
AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY
ONE prerequisite to diversity jurisdiction in the federal courts is that
the amount in controversy exceed in value the sum of $Iooo.1 The
recent Supreme Court case of Horton v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
Company2 presented the question of how to determine the amount in
controversy.
In the Horton case, a worker had filed a claim with the Texas In-
dustrial Accident Board for disability benefits of $14,035, but had been
awarded only $i,o5o. The insurer instituted a diversity action in a
United States district court to set aside the award.3 The worker, also
dissatisfied with the award, instituted an action in a state court for
$14,035, then moved to dismiss the insurer's federal court action for
lack of jurisdiction, simultaneously filing a counterclaim for $14,035
contingent upon denial of the motion to dismiss. The district court
dismissed the insurer's suit on the ground that the jurisdictional amount
was not present.' The Court of Appeals, relying on Texas law, found
the requisite amount to be involved.5 After granting certiorari, the
' "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of. So,ooo, exclusive of interest and
costs. .... " 78 U.S.C. § 1332 (1958). It also is an element of federal question juris-
diction. 28 U.S.C. § 133i (x958).
But cf. a8 U.S.C. §§ 1333-6o (1958), where Congress has provided that the
amount in controversy shall be immaterial in certain types of cases, principally those
dealing with admiralty, bankruptcy, internal revenue, patents, trademarks, and copy-
rights,
' 367 U.s. 348 (196i).
' Texas law permits any dissatisfied party in a workmen's compensation action to
"bring suit in the county where the injury occurred to set aside said final ruling and
decision," and the" issues shall be heard "upon trial de novo, and the burden or [sic]
proof shall be upon the party claiming c6mpensation." In such de nova trial, the
recovery may not exceed "the maximum compensation allowed under the provisions of
this law." TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 8307, § 5 (x956).
'In its memorandum opinion, the district court approved the discussion of the
problem in National Sur. Corp. v. Chamberlain, 17x F. Supp. 591- (N.D. Tex. 19s9).
Brief for Petitioner, Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348 (.96.), p. 4.
In the Chamberlain case the court said: "[T]he amount in controversy in this suit is
the value of the right of plaintiff National Surety Corporation to be free from the
$2,000 liability fastened upon it by the award of the Industrial Accident Board." xiz
F. Supp. at 597-98. Accord, Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cook, x7 F. Supp. 710 (N.D. Tex.
1959).
'Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Horton, 275 F.2d 148 (sth Cir. i96o), 39 TEXAS L.
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Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals by a five
to four vote. Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the Court, found from the
allegation in the complaint that the worker had a counterclaim in excess
of $io,ooo and from the record as a whole that the jurisdictional
amount was "unquestionably" involved.6
Heretofore, the lower federal courts have evolved three formulae
for detemining the amount in controversy. Of the two formulae
applied in coercive actions, the first has been referred to as the "plaintiff
viewpoint" rule, under which the amount in controversy is determined
by the value to the plaintiff of the right which he asserts in good faith
in his pleading.8 This rule, followed in many lower federal courts,'
REV. 343 (i96). The Court of Appeals placed its decision on alternate grounds.
For the first ground, the court relied on the case of Booth v. Texas Employers' Ins.
Ass'n, 132 Tex. 237, 123 S.W.2d 322 (1938), in which the Texas Supreme Court held
that where the award of the Board was less than the amount of the claim of the worker,
the claim determined the amount in controversy in the state courts. Applying this
holding, the court concluded that the worker's claim for $x4,035 governed and juris-
diction was shown. 275 F.2d at xs5o.
As a "further and additional" ground, the court cited cases holding that if a com-
pulsory counterclaim is filed which is in excess of So,ooo, jurisdiction is established,
regardless of the complaint. 275 F.zd at 1Sa.
Professor Moore has criticized the decision of the Court of Appeals: 1.... [T]he
proper ruling was that of the district court in Chamberlain." I MOORE, FEDERAL
PRAc'rCE 0.93, at 859 (2d ed. 196o). [Hereinafter cited as MooRE.] See note 4
Jupra.
"367 U.S. at 353-54.
As to the first ground of decision in the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court re-
jected the applicability of Texas law to determine the jurisdictional amount, noting
that such a determination was "a federal question to be decided under federal standards."
Id, at 352. However, the Court said that "the federal courts must, of course, look to
state law to determine the nature and extent of the right to be enforced in a diversity
case." Id. at 352-53.
The second ground of decision was ignored. (See note 5 supra.)
"See generally Dobie, Jurisdictional Amount in United States District Courts, 38
HARV. L. REv. 733 (1925); Ilsen & Sardell, The Monetary Minimum in Federal
Court Jurisdiction, 29 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1, 183 (955); Comment, 46 CALIF. L.
REV. 6oi (gs8); Note, 73 HARY. L. REV. 1369 (596o).
aDobie, supra note 7, at 734. In this article, which first explicitly stated this rule,
Dobie discusses earlier Supreme Court cases which speak to the problem. Id. at 742-44.
For an example of the application of this rule, see Cowell v. City Water Supply
Co., 121 Fed. 53 (8th Cir. 1903). Here the plaintiff sued to cancel mortgages on the
waterworks totaling $475,ooo. The court, however, held that the value to the plaintiff
was only that of his proportional share or M265. The case was dismissed for lack of the
requisite jurisdictional amount.
A coercive action is one in which the judgment can be enforced directly by an order
of execution of proceedings in contempt of court.
See, e.g., Stewart v. Shanahan, 277 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 196o ) ; Wade v. Rogala,
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meshes well with the doctrine that jurisdiction is to be determined from
the initial pleading.'0 It lends itself to relatively easy application and
provides a measure of certainty in determining whether jurisdiction
attaches."
In coercive actions authority has also arisen for the "alternate valua-
tion" rule, under which the amount in controversy is measured by the
pecuniary result to either party which a judgment in the case would
directly produce.' 2 This standard' recognizes that a federal forum
270 F.2d ao ( 3 d Cir. 1959) Payne v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., z66 F.2d
63 ( 5 th Cir. 1959); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Railway Express Agency, 253 F.zd
78o (6th Cir. 1958); Wyoming Ry. v. Herrington, 163 F.zd 1004 (xoth Cir. 1947);
Purcell v. Summers, 126 F.zd 390 ( 4 th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 640 (194.);
Central Mexico Light & Power Co. v. Munch, i16 F.zd 85 (2d Cir. 1940 ) ; Gavica
v. Donaugh, 93 F.zd 173 (9th Cir. 1937).
In St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288 (1938), the
Supreme Court said: "the rule governing dismissal for want of jurisdiction . . . is
that . . . the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in
good faith." It has been claimed that this decision was an adoption of the plaintiff
viewpoint rule by the Supreme Court. See i MOORE: Jo.91, at 827 (2d ed. 196o).
But see Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442, 447 (1942), where the Court held the
amount to be determined by the judgment's "pecuniary consequence to those involved
in the litigation."
Courts often confuse the "good faith" test of the St. Paul case, supra, witih the
plaintiff viewpoint rule and cite the cases interchangeably.
"°For a statement of the doctrine that the jurisdiction is determined from the
initial pleading, see St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283
(1938); Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U.S. 594 (1916)5 Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Fowles,
154 F.2d 884 ( 9 th Cir. 1946); Sparks v. England, 113 F.zd 579 (8th Cir. 1940);
Zicos v. Dickmann, 98 F.2d 347 (8th Cir. 1938).
The concurrence of these two doctrines allows a federal court to determine juris-
diction merely by looking to the complaint. See also FED. R. CIV. P. 3.
'See i MOORE o.91, at 8z8 (2d ed. i96o).
"See, Ridder Bros. v. Blethen, 142 F.2d 395 ( 9th Cir. 1944) ; Ronzio v. Denver
& R.G.W.R.R., 16 F.ad 604 (oth Cir. 1940 ) ; King v. Southern Ry., 119 Fed. xox6
(C.C.N.D. Ga. 1go); Doggett v. Hunt, 93 F. Supp. 426 (S.D. Ala. 195o ) ; Sterl v.
Sears, 88 F. Supp. 431 (N.D. Tex. 195o ) ; Shipe v. Floral Hills, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 985
(W.D. Mo. 1949) 5 Griffith v. Enochs, 43 F. Supp. 352 (W.D. La. 194Z); New
Jersey Fed'n of Young Men's and Young Women's Hebrew Assns v. Hoffman, 25 F.
Supp. 687 (M.D. Pa. 19 38);Ross v. Southern Ry., 2o F. Supp. 556 (W.D.S.C. 1937) ;
Armstrong v. Townsend, 8 F. Supp. 953 (S.D. Ind. 1934).
The leading case, Elliott v. Empire Natural Gas Co., 4 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1925),
relies heavily on language in Smith v. Adams, 130 U.S. 167, 175 (1889), where the
Court said, "it is conceded that the pecuniary value of the matter in dispute may be
determined . . . by the pecuniary result to one of the parties . . . from the judgment."
For an illustration of the application of this rule, see Ronzio v. Denver &
R.G.W.R.R., supra. In this case, the plaintiff brought an action to quiet title in the
water rights of a certain stream. It was stipulated by the parties that the value of the
water for the plaintiff's agricultural purposes was $2,000, while for use by the de-
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should not be denied if the value of either party's interest exceeds the
requisite amount.13
In actions for declaratory judgments courts have determined the
amount in controversy in a more realistic manner. 14  They have con-
sidered the broadest possible dimensions of the controversy, rather than
relying entirely on that which is pleaded in the complaint.' 5 Thus,
fendant railroad, the water was valued in excess of $3,000 (then the jurisdictional
amount). The court found jurisdiction by looking to the value of the defendant's
interest. Obviously the result would have been different under the "plaintiff view-
point" rule. See note 8 supra.
"SSee Sterl v. Sears, supra note 12, at 432. The term "alternate valuation rule"
was suggested by Comment, 46 CALip. L. R-v. 6oz (x958). For a discussion of situa-
tions where the defendant's interest presents a "more rational basis" for determining the
amount in controversy, see Note, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1369 (196o).
These rules are not inflexible rules of law, however, for courts often have molded
them to accomplish desired results. For example, in Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Food
Fair, Inc., 177 F.zd 177 (ist Cir. 1949)
, 
the plaintiff sued for an injunction to pro-
hibit the defendant from using the name "Food Fair." The court, purporting to follow
the "plaintiff viewpoint" rule, held that jurisdiction would attach if the plaintiff's net
assets, sales or advertising expenses exceeded So,ooo. Since the logical measure of
jurisdictional amount is the loss of revenue sustained from the infraction, the decision
would seem to be based on an unarticulated policy of allowing these suits in federal
court, possibly because of the similarity to situations covered by federal regulation.
For other cases adhering to the rule set down in the Food Fair case, see Beneficial In-
dustrial Loan Corp. v. Kline, 13z F.2d 520 (8th Cir. 1942); Nash-Kelvinator Corp.
v. California Refrigerator Repair Shop, xx F.R.D. 313 (S.D. Cal. 595o); Baker v.
Master Printers Union, 34 F. Supp. 8oS (D.N.J. 1940). Contra, e.g., Segram-
Distillers Corp. v. New Cut Rate Liquors, Inc., 245 F.zd 4-53 (7th Cir. 1947); Sun-
beam Corp. v. Richardson, 144 F. Supp. 583 (W.D. Ky. 1956).
For an example of cases in which the court has molded the rule to deny jurisdiction,
see Pianta v. H. M. Reich Co., 77 F.zd 888 (2d Cir. 1935), where, in a suit to have
a receiver appointed for the company, the court held that the plaintiff's claim, not the
assets of the company, governed the jurisdictional amount. Such a decision results in
the favoring of proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act rather than a receivership under
state law.
"' Such an approach is due in part to the fact that the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28
U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1958), is a procedural act and as such is to be interpreted broadly.
Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (i95o); Aetna Life Ins, Co.
v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937); Simmonds Aerocessories, Ltd. v. Elastic Stop Nut
Corp., 257 F.zd 485 ( 3 d Cir. 1958); Donnely v. Mavar Shrimp & Oyster Co., 19o
F.zd 409 (sth Cir. .95i). This approach also aids in implementing the policy of
allowing early suits to prevent the accrual of needless damage. Davis v. American
Foundry Equip. Co., 94 F.2d 441 (7 th Cir. 1938); E. Edelmann & Co. v. Triple-A
Specialty Co., 88 F.2d 852 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 68o (1937).
25 "It is the nature of the controversy, not the method of its presentation or the
particular party who presents it, that is determinative [of the amount in controversy]."
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 244 (1937).
See, e.g., American Cas. Co. v. Howard, 173 F.2d 924 ( 4 th Cir. 1949); Mutual
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where the validity of an entire commercial or insurance contract is called
into question, the face value of the contract, not the amount recoverable
in a coercive action, determines the amount in controversy. 6
On the facts of the Horton case, it is debatable whether the Court
applied the "alternate valuation" or the "plaintiff viewpoint" rule. Un-
der Texas workmen's compensation law, if either party initiates court
action, the award of the Board becomes void, and the trial is de novo.17
In such a de novo trial the defendant would have the opportunity to
prove liability up to $14,035 on the part of the insurer. 8 Thus under
the "plaintiff viewpoint" rule, the insurer would have a right to be free
not only of a $I,O5o award, but of a potential claim of $i4,o35.'9
Arguably, however, the Court construed the insurer's right as merely a
right to set aside the Board's award. Under this analysis it would seem
Life Ins. Co. v. Moyle, i16 F.2d 434 ( 4 th Cir. 194o) 5 E. Edelmann & Co. v. Triple-A
Specialty Co., supra note 14.
" Non-insurance contracts: see Davis v. American Foundry Equip. Co., 94 F.2d
441 (7 th Cir. 1938); M. Swift & Sons, Inc. v. Lemon, 24 F.R.D. 43 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
Insurance contracts: see Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Northwest Nat. Bank, 228 F.2d
391 ( 7 th Cir. 1955)5 Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Schantz, 178 F.2d 779 (Sth Cir.
1949); Home Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Trotter, 130 F.2d goo (8th Cir. 1942).
However, where the only question is the validity of a certain claim under a policy,
the amount of the claim, not the face value of the policy, is usually held to measure the
amount in controversy. Kaufman v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 245 F.2d 9x8 ( 3 d Cir.
1957)i American Cas. Co. v. Howard, supra n.i5s Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Moyle,
supra n.15. Contra, C. E. Carnes & Co. v. Employer's Liability Assur. Corp., zor
F.2d 739 '(sth Cir. 1939).
In cases arising under federal question jurisdiction, notably cases involving patent
infringement, the courts have consistently held that "a declaratory judgment action to
adjudicate the validity and infringement of a patent is within the jurisdiction of the
federal courts . . . whether the action is brought by the patentee or the alleged in-
fringer." Eastman Kodak Co. v. Velveray Corp., 175 F. Supp. 646, 648 (S.D.N.Y.
1959). .4ccord, E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Byrnes, soi F.2d 14 (2d Cir.
1939)5 E. Edelmann & Co. v. Triple-A Specialty Co., 88 F.zd 852 (7 th Cir.), cert.
denied, 300 U.S. 68o (1937)5 Formaster Corp. v. G. A. Bishop Co., 138 F. Supp.
115 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). This is true even though the alleged infringer, to state a federal
question, must anticipate the basis of the defendant's claim in the patent laws, contrary
to the doctrine of Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (19o8), that a federal
question cannot be anticipated.
"TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 8307, § 5 (956), supra note 3, as interpreted by the
Texas Supreme Court in Booth v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 132 Tex. 237, 123
S.W.2d 322 (1938).
"
8 See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 8307, § 5 (.956), supra note 3-
" The Court pointed out that the insurer's complaint alleged that the worker "has
claimed, now claims and will claim" $14,0355 and, since this had been neither dis-
claimed nor denied, the worker failed to show to a "legal certainty" that a $14,035
claim was not involved. 367 U.S. at 353-
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that the "alternate valuation" rule was applied, for a declaration of the
insurer's non-liability would deny to the worker a possible $14,035
judgment.2°
The language of the opinion is much broader than either rule for
coercive actions requires. Moreover, the dissenting Justices, in an
opinion by Mr. Justice Clark, strongly urge that the majority in essence
has eliminated the distinction between declaratory judgments and con-
ventional actions by applying the broad amount-in-controversy standard
used in declaratory judgment actions to a suit for coercive relief. Thus,
according to the dissent, cases which normally would be styled declara-
tory judgment cases could be brought as coercive actions, eliminating
the discretion of the federal courts under the Declaratory Judgment
Act and forcing them to take cases inappropriate to federal adjudica-
tion.21 The dissent further argues that the majority allows the plaintiff
to affix jurisdiction by alleging a possible counterclaim, a holding which
would greatly expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts.2
Another problem raised both by the majority and the dissenting
opinions involves the 1958 amendment to the judicial code that pro-
hibits the removal of workmen's compensation cases to the federal
courts. 23 The legislative history of the amendment indicates that the
purpose was to eliminate the large number of removal cases24 in those
"The Court pointed out that "the claim before the Board was $14,0355 the state
court suit of the petitioner asked that much; the conditional counterclaim in the federal
court claims the same amount. Texas law under which this claim was created and has
its being leaves the entire $14,035 claim open for adjudication in a de novo court
trial regardless of the award2' 367 U.S. at 353-54.
21 367 U.S. at 359.
It is settled that the Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-o (1958), is
essentially equitable in nature and under it, the courts may decline to exercise their
equitable jurisdiction if sufficient reason exists. Public Service Comm. of Utah v.
Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237 (1952) ; Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S.
491 (1942). Had the Horton case been styled a declaratory judgment, it is probable
that the court would have dismissed it under the exercise of this discretion, for the case
concerned a state-created right and state statutes. See 6 MOORE 57.08, at 3o35, and
cases cited therein.
22 367 U.S. at 358.
8S U.S.C. § 1445(c) (1958). This amendment also raised the jurisdictional
amount to sio,ooo; provided that a corporation is deemed a citizen of the state of its
principal place of business as well as of the state of incorporation; and gave district
court judges a discretionary power to impose costs on a plaintiff recovering less than
$o,ooo. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-32 (958). Each part of the amendment was aimed ai
reducing the caseload in the federal courts. 367 U.S. at 350-51.
" In Texas in 1957, there were 2147 workmen's compensation cases instituted in
federal courts, of which 1148 came by removal from the state courts. S. REP. No.
. Vol. 1962: 123] FEDERAYL CIVIL PROCEDURE
states where a workmen's compensation claim is heard de novo in the
state court.25 The Horton case seems to circumvent the spirit of the
amendment by allowing the insurer to gain a federal forum simply by
filing to set aside whatever award is made by the Board and alleging
a counterclaim by the worker in excess of the jurisdictional amount.26
The view of the majority is in line with the modern judicial em-
phasis on substance rather than form. The majority opinion, however,
lends itself to the interpretation and criticisms of the dissent,28 for the
183o at 8. (Jurisdictional amount was then $3,ooo.) The x958 amendment was
intended to eliminate all removal cases, and, by the increase in jurisdictional amount,
many of the original suits. The Horton case will go far to vitiate the effectiveness
of the prohibition on removal by allowing these actions to be brought as original ones.
" The report of the Senate Judiciary Committee specifically mentioned Alabama,
Louisiana, New Mexico and Texas. S. REs'. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 34
(1958) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 1830]. Statutes in Alabama, Louisiana and
New Mexico create a right in the worker to be instituted in court. ALA. CoDE tit.
26, § 297 (1958) i LA. REv. STAT. § 23:1311 (195o) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-Wo-13.7
(596o). Texas has an administrative hearing, but provides that a trial de novo may be
had by any dissatisfied party. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 8307, § 5 (1956).
Removal may be had only from a trial de novo, for the U.S. district courts have
no jurisdiction over appeals taken from state administrative hearings. Chicago, R.I. &
P.R.R. v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574 (1953).
" The majority opinion noted explicitly that Congress had barred removal of such
cases, but at the same time had left unchanged "the old language which .. .permits
civil suits to be filed in federal-courts in cases where there are both diversity of citizen-
ship and the prescribed jurisdictional amount." 367 U.S. at 352. A virtual appeal
for legislative action to close the loophole was made: "Congress could very easily have
used language to bar filing of workmen's compensation suits by the insurer as well as
removal of such suits, and it could easily do so still." Ibid.
2 In the case of Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 5o0 (-959), the
Court was faced with a somewhat analogous situation. The plaintiff sought a declara-
tory judgment of his rights under a contract with the defendant and asked for an in-
junction against possible suits. The defendant counterclaimed for treble damages
under the anti-trust laws, and asked for a jury trial on the factual issues. The lower
court felt that the complaint was essentially equitable in nature and no jury trial was
possible. The Supreme Court granted jury trial, feeling that although the availability
of declaratory relief allowed the natural defendant to bring the suit, the relief should
not go so far as to deprive the natural plaintiff of his right to jury trial.
8 The dissenter's fear of wholesale allegations of possible counterclaims should be
assessed in light of the fact that the allegation in this case was well supported by ex-
trinsic facts. The fear of the dissent, however, is made more credible by a recent un-
reported case, Hart v. United States Fid. and Guar. Co., decided by the District Court
for the Northern District of Texas on June 16, 196i, cert. denied, 30 U.S.L. WEEK
3145 (U.S. Nov. 7, 1961). In the case, a worker filed a general claim before the
Industrial Accident Board, claiming no specific amount. He was awarded $91o. The
insurer immediately filed suit in federal district court to set aside the award, alleging
that the worker's claim was more than $o,ooo. The worker counterclaimed for
$6,31o. He unsuccessfully challenged the jurisdiction of the court. It would seem
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Court does seem to have adopted the broad standard used in declaratory
judgments to determine the amount in controversy. 2 The court's
opinion fails to give a definite guideline for the lower courts, so that
the uncertainty attendant to the application of the earlier rules has
been replaced by uncertainty as to the proper interpretation of the hold-
ing in the instant case. Moreover, the immediate effect of the Horton
case is to vitiate somewhat the effectiveness of the 1958 amendment
which sought to reduce workmen's compensation litigation in the federal
courts. Congressional action will be needed to effect the aims of the
amendment, but it is also to be hoped that the Supreme Court will
clarify its standard for determination of the amount in controversy.
that the district court, relying greatly on the Horton case, maintained jurisdiction on
the ground that the counterclaim could have been more than so,ooo. Brief of
Petitioner, p. 3, Hart v. United States Fid. and Guar. Co. (N.D. Tex. 196!).
" "Thus the record before us shows beyond a doubt that the award is challenged
by both parties and is binding on neither; that petitioner claims more than $xoooo
from the respondent and the respondent denies it should have to pay petitioner any-
thing at all. No matter which party brings it into court, the controversy remains the
same; it involves the same amount of money and is to be adjudicated and determined
under the same rules." 367 U.S. at 354. The language is quite similar to that of
the Court in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (937), a declaratory
judgment case. The pertinent language in the Haworth case is quoted in note z5
supra.
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